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Abstract
From being a love that dared not speak its name to one that is legally recognized by many countries today,
same-sex acts and relations have indeed undergone a remarkable transformation in terms of how they are
perceived and, consequently, regulated. Yet, globally speaking, this transformation is taking place unevenly as
many countries continue to criminalize homosexuality and the commission of same-sex acts.
In Asia, a region that has traditionally if misguidedly been seen as more sexually conservative than the so-
called 'Wild West,' the debate over the acceptability of homosexuality rages on. As three of Asia’s most
economically developed, cosmopolitan, and Confucian Chinese-majority societies, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Taiwan nevertheless treat homosexuality very differently; sex between males continue to be a crime in
Singapore while Taiwan appears poised to be Asia’s first country to legalize same-sex marriage.
This paper seeks to examine the domestic and external factors that combine to produce in each country a
unique set of dynamics and logics governing public policy and discourse about homosexuality. It is argued
that one-party hegemony in Singapore, transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China, and Taiwan’s insecure
international status vis-à-vis China represent the primary factors mediating state regulation of homosexuality.
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ABSTRACT 
From being a love that dared not speak its name to one that is legally recognized by many 
countries today, societal attitudes and legal positions regarding homosexuality have undergone a 
remarkable transformation in the past half a century. Yet, globally speaking, this transformation 
is taking place unevenly as many countries continue to criminalize homosexuality and the 
commission of same-sex acts. In Asia, a region that has traditionally if misguidedly been seen as 
more sexually conservative than the Wild West, the debate over the acceptability of 
homosexuality rages on. As three of Asia’s most economically developed, cosmopolitan, and 
Confucian Chinese-majority societies, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan nevertheless treat 
homosexuality very differently; sex between males continue to be a crime in Singapore while 
Taiwan appears poised to be Asia’s first country to legalize same-sex marriage. This paper seeks 
to examine the domestic and external factors that combine to produce in each country a unique 
set of dynamics and logics governing public policy and discourse about homosexuality. It is 
argued that one-party hegemony in Singapore, transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China, 
and Taiwan’s insecure international status vis-à-vis China represent the primary factors 
mediating state regulation of homosexuality. This paper also includes a survey of traditional 
Chinese, Confucian, and Japanese attitudes regarding homosexuality, as well as the implications 
of Singapore being the only de jure independent sovereign state among the three case studies. 
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I. Introduction: 
 Unbeknown to the New York City police officers who raided the Stonewall Inn, a well-
established gay bar in Greenwich Village, on 28th June 1969 in an otherwise regular harassment 
of the city’s “gay and lesbian underground culture,”1 that event would go on to become “the 
defining moment for the dramatic entrance of gay and lesbian”2 political movements into 
American public life. Instead of acquiescing in the face of police actions as patrons of such 
nightlife establishments had usually done in an era when homosexuality was classified as a 
psychiatric disorder in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM),3 those at the Stonewall Inn mounted a fierce resistance.4 
What followed was a flowering of “new and more visible gay groups,”5 the popular 
circulation of the term “coming out,”6 and, as suggested above, a slow but undeniable 
development toward greater cultural and legal acceptance of homosexuality. Of course, 
embedded in all efforts to define a particular moment in history as the turning point is an 
inescapable degree of artificiality and arbitrariness; by privileging one set of information or 
viewpoints, the historian is, by definition, under-privileging another that might lead to very 
different narratives. 
                                                          
1 John David Skrentny, “White Males and the Limits of the Minority Rights Revolution: The Disabled, White Ethnics, and 
Gays,” in The Minority Rights Revolution (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 315. 
2 David A. J. Richards, “Breaking the Silence,” in The Sodomy Cases: Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas (Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 2009), pp. 21. 
3 Not until December 1973 did the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association decide, in its proposed changes to 
the sixth printing of the DSM, to declassify homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder. American Psychiatric Association Document 
Reference No. 730008 
4 For more information on the riots, see David Carter, Stonewall: The Riots That Sparked the Gay Revolution (New York: St 
Martin’s Griffins, 2010) 
5 John David Skrentny, “White Males and the Limits of the Minority Rights Revolution: The Disabled, White Ethnics, and 
Gays,” in The Minority Rights Revolution (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 316. 
6 Ibid. 
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Suffice then to underline that although “a few brave souls had publicly declared 
themselves and even banded together for limited political purposes [in the pre-Stonewall era,] the 
vast majority of gay people were locked away in painful isolation and fear, doing everything 
possible not to declare themselves. Many [even] cursed [their] fate [and] longed to be straight.”7    
In the past forty odd years since Stonewall, a sea-change has occurred in how human 
sexuality in general and homosexuality in particular have been perceived both within the United 
States (US) and globally. For example, while the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(UN DHR) of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 
1966 said nothing about sexual orientation,8 in 2011, under the leadership of South Africa, the 
UN Human Rights Council adopted the first UN resolution (Resolution 17/19) that explicitly 
addressed sexual orientation and gender identity.9 
While Illinois notably became the first state in America to decriminalize same-sex acts 
and thus effectively homosexuality in 1961,10 sodomy laws—legal prohibitions against so-called 
unnatural sexual conduct such as anal penetration—were deemed unconstitutional by the US 
Supreme Court in the landmark Lawrence v. Texas ruling in 2003.11 While same-sex marriage 
was not legal anywhere in the 1960s, it now is in fourteen countries and certain parts of three 
others.12 In addition, more Americans today support rather than oppose marriage equality.13    
                                                          
7 Martin Duberman, “Prologue,” in Cures: A Gay Man’s Odyssey, Tenth Anniversary Edition (Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), 
pp. 3  
8 The full texts of the UN DHR and the ICCPR are available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ and 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx respectively 
9 For a copy of the resolution, visit http://iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/Resolution_17%3A19_2011_%20HRC_HRSOGI.pdf 
10 William N. Eskridge Jr., “The Case(s) Against Sodomy Laws, 1935 – 61,” in Dishonorable Passions: Sodomy Laws in 
America 1861-2003 (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), pp. 111  
11 For more information on Lawrence v. Texas, consult Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas – 
How a Bedroom Arrest Decriminalized Gay Americans (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2012) 
12 As of March 2013, the following countries have legalized same-sex marriage (bracketed value represents the year in which 
same-sex marriage was legalized): The Netherlands (2000), Belgium (2003), Canada (2005), Spain (2005), South Africa (2006), 
Norway (2009), Sweden (2009), Argentina (2010), Iceland (2010), Portugal (2012), Denmark (2012), France (2013), New 
Zealand (2013), and Uruguay (2013). In United States (2003), Mexico (2009), and Brazil (2011), same-sex marriage is legal in 
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Notwithstanding the remarkable developments regarding homosexuality’s legality and 
acceptability, there remains in large parts of the world legal regimes and cultural practices that 
are either resistant or hostile to homosexuality. According to the International Lesbian Gay 
Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), as of May 2013, there were some 76 countries 
that continued to treat private, consensual same-sex acts between adults as a crime.14 Notably, 
none of these 76 countries are from Europe or Northern America; the bulk of them are from 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 
In other words, a likely conclusion to draw from the current global landscape of gay and 
lesbian rights is that they have made more headway, that is, happened faster and gone further, in 
the West than any other region in the world. Still, this observation should not obscure the fact 
that a broadly comparable development regarding gay and lesbian identities and rights-
consciousness is unfolding outside the West. 
As “part of the rapid globalization of lifestyle and identity politics,”15 there is a clear if 
problematic “emergence of ostensibly Western-style lesbian and gay identities”16 in the 
numerous non-Western societies. Given that Asian economies in general and East Asian ones in 
particular “grew faster than the rest of the world”17 since the 1960s, it is unsurprising that 
Western-inflected expressions of sexual identities and differences found many outlets in the 
region’s burgeoning cities. To be sure, the generation of “new forms of social space that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
some, but not all, parts of the country. See James Q. Wilson, John J. Dilulio, Jr., Meena Bose, “Civil Rights,” in American 
Government: Institutions & Policies (Kentucky: Cengage Learning,  2014), pp. 146 
13 Peyton Craighill and Scott Clement, “Support for same-sex marriage hits new high; half say Constitution guarantees right,” 
The Washington Post, March 5, 2014, accessed March 27, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/support-for-same-sex-
marriage-hits-new-high-half-say-constitution-guarantees-right/2014/03/04/f737e87e-a3e5-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html 
14 For a copy of the ILGA State-Sponsored Homophobia Report, visit http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/o5VlRM41Oq 
15 Dennis Altman, “Rupture of Continuity? The Internationalization of Gay Identities,” Social Text 48 (1996): 78 
16 “Introduction,” in AsiaPacifiQueer: Rethinking Genders and Sexualities (2008) 
17 Steven Radelet, Jeffrey Sachs, Jong-Wha Lee, “Economic Growth in Asia,” background paper for the Asian Development 
Bank’s Emerging Asia: Changes and Challenges available for download at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/hiid/papers/ecgasia.pdf  
8 
 
reorganize the discursive practices of marginalized groups”18 was always mediated, indeed 
constrained, by the broader political systems responsible for the stellar economic growth.  
Nevertheless, Asia’s economic “affluence gave many the opportunity to travel and 
experience gay/lesbian cultures”19 beyond the borders of the region. While it is plainly inaccurate 
to think that homoerotic cultures or concepts did not exist in Asia before the economic boom in 
the second half of the 20th century,20 it is similarly misguided to ignore the material and complex 
ways in which gay and lesbian cultures in globalizing Asia have been mediated by the “spread of 
postmodern consumer capitalism”21 of which the West in general and the US in particular remain 
towering icons.  
Beyond products and lifestyles, the influence of Western discourses on homosexuality 
and its place in a free and modern society has been considerable in Asia. This influence is 
especially visible and acute in Asian societies that have most enthusiastically embraced free 
market capitalism and the rule-of-law. Indeed, acceptance of and resistance to the claims of gay 
rights in such Asian countries have, with important differences, mirrored the dominant liberal—
conservative dichotomy in the West. For Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, conservatism is 
itself a curious if contradictory blend of an ostensibly (sexually) prudish brand of Confucian 
‘Asian Values’ and evangelical Christian morality. In these countries, homosexuality-denying 
groups (of which the state and the judiciary are sometimes important parts) frown upon the 
aggressiveness and effectiveness of gay rights advocacy groups in the West. 
                                                          
18 Chou Wah-shan, “Going Beyond “Cultural Carnival versus Political Confrontation”: Pluralities of Contemporary Taiwanese 
Tongzhi Discourses,” in Tongzhi: Politics of Same-Sex Eroticism in Chinese Societies (New York: The Haworth Press, 2000), pp. 
144 
19 Peter A. Jackson, “Pre-Gay, Post Queer: Thai Perspectives on Proliferating Gender/Sex Diversity in Asia,” in Gay and Lesbian 
Asia: Culture, Identity, Community (New York: Harrington Park Press, 2001), pp. 2 
20 For more information on indigenous Asian gay and lesbian cultures, refer to Peter A. Jackson and Gerard Sullivan eds, Gay 
and Lesbian Asia: Culture, Identity, Community (New York: Harrington Park Press, 2001) or Fran Martin, Peter A. Jackson, 
Mark McLelland, and Audrey Yue eds. AsiaPacifiQueer: Rethinking Genders and Sexualities (Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008) 
21 Chris Berry, A Bit on the Side: East-West Topographies of Desire (Sydney: EMPress, 1994), pp. 11 
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This paper is primarily interested in discerning and scrutinizing the factors that most 
influence the extent to which negative and positive gay and lesbian rights are enshrined in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. For this purpose, negative gay and lesbian right is taken to mean 
the decriminalization of consensual and private same-sex acts between adults while positive 
rights refer to the legal enactment of, among others, anti-discrimination regulation and same-sex 
marriage. 
Specifically, this paper will analyse the history and politics regarding negative gay and 
lesbian rights in Hong Kong and Singapore—both former British colonies that inherited sodomy 
laws criminalizing consensual and private same-sex acts—and those regarding positive gay and 
lesbian rights in Taiwan, a former Japanese colony without a history of criminalizing such same-
sex acts.  
The choice of case studies is informed by the fact that these countries are some of Asia’s 
most Westernized ones; they are certainly some of the most economically developed countries in 
the region. More importantly, they share the following geographic, demographic, historical, 
cultural, and economic traits: 
1) Geography: All three are small and urban (bracketed value denotes percentage of urban 
population)22: Hong Kong is 1,104 kilometres square (100%); Taiwan, 36,193 (78%)23; 
Singapore, 710 (100%). 
2) Demography: All three are dominated by Chinese peoples (bracketed value denotes 
percentage of Chinese citizens): Hong Kong (94%)24; Taiwan (98%); and Singapore 
(74.2%).25 
                                                          
22 Date from World Bank, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS 
23 Data from the United Nations, available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm 
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3) History: Hong Kong and Singapore were British colonies until 1997 and 1963 
respectively; Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945 
4) Culture: All three countries lay claim to a common Confucian heritage 
5) Economy – highly developed and open (bracketed value denotes rank position on annual 
Index of Economic Freedom/GDP per capita)26: Hong Kong (1st/$51,494); Singapore 
(2nd/$60,410); Taiwan (17th/$38,749) 
As aforementioned, despite these similarities, important differences exist in how 
homosexuality is popularly imagined, publicly discussed, and legally treated in each country. 
Most conspicuously, Singapore is an outlier among the three countries in that it continues to 
criminalize private same-sex acts between consenting male adults. Indeed, of the roughly 76 
countries that still criminalize same-sex acts globally, Singapore stands out as the only country 
with what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies as an advanced economy.27 This 
paper seeks to account for this apparent incongruity. In addition, this paper will also explain why 
Taiwan became the most homosexuality-affirming among the three case studies. 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Data from Hong Kong government, available at http://www.had.gov.hk/rru/english/info/info_dem.html 
25 Date from Singapore Tourism Board, available at 
http://www.yoursingapore.com/content/traveller/en/browse/aboutsingapore/people-lang-culture.html 
26 Data from Heritage Foundation’s 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, available at http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
27 Refer to Table B of the Statistical Appendix in IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2013) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf 
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II. History of Sodomy Laws in Hong Kong and Singapore: 
 The earliest recorded mentions of “sodomy” in English law can be traced back to the 
reign of King Edward I (1239 to 1307) in the medieval period. In particular, Fleta, seu 
Commentarius Juris Anglicani, a Latin survey of English law, and Britton, a Norman French 
summary of English Common Laws both contain explicit references to sexual acts between men 
as well as any other sexual conduct deemed offensive to Christian theology.28 
To be sure, sodomites were not the only persecuted class in twelfth- and thirteenth-
century Europe: lepers, witches, prostitutes, heretics, and Jews, among other minority groups, 
also faced the wrath of “clerics and courtiers [eager to] extend the power and advance the 
interests of their masters, while consolidating their own position and undermining potential 
rivals”29 in “a persecuting society, rather than simply a society with persecution.”30 
 This juridical forbidding of sodomy persisted even after King Henry VIII’s decision to 
remove England from the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church. In 1533, the same year 
when Henry VIII coerced the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer, to annul the marriage 
between him and Catherine of Aragon, England passed its first civil sodomy law named the 
Buggery Act; until then, sodomy “was unquestionably an ecclesiastical offence only.”31 
The Act, itself an assertion of Henry VIII’s resolve to challenge and circumscribe the role 
of the Catholic Church in his Reformation State,32 punished the “detestable and abominable Vice 
                                                          
28 Alok Gupta, “”Sodomy,” Colonialism, and Codification” in This Alien Legacy: The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British 
Colonialism (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), pp. 13  
29 R. I. Moore, “A Persecuting Society,” in The Formation of a Persecuting Society (Singapore: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 
144 
30 Ibid., pp. 156 
31 Francois Lafitte, “Homosexuality and the Law,” in British Journal of Delinquency 9 (1958): 13 
32 Ibid., pp. 15 
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of Buggery committed with mankind or beast”33 with death. While the Act was repealed when 
Mary I, a Catholic, ascended the English throne in 1553, it was reinstated wholesale in 1563 
under the reign of Elizabeth I, a Protestant.34 
 By the time Singapore and Hong Kong became British colonies in 1824 and 1842 
respectively,35 then, sodomy remained a crime punishable by death in England. The Indian Penal 
Code (IPC)—“the first comprehensive codified criminal law produced anywhere in the British 
Empire”36—was completed in 1837 under the lead authorship of Thomas Babington Macaulay 
and came into force in 1860. Section 377 of the Code read as follows: 
 Unnatural Offences – Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with 
imprisonment… for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall be liable to fine. 
 Explanation – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to 
the offence described in this Section.        
 While the IPC “became the model for British colonies’ legal systems throughout most of 
Asia and Africa,”37 it also influenced the English Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 which 
replaced the death penalty for the crime of buggery with “Penal Servitude for Life or for any 
Term not less than Ten Years.”38 The criminalization of the act of anal intercourse was imported 
into the law books of Hong Kong when it, in 1865, adopted an Offences Against the Person 
                                                          
33 Alok Gupta, “”Sodomy,” Colonialism, and Codification” in This Alien Legacy: The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British 
Colonialism (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), pp. 14 
34 H. Montgomery Hyde, The Other Love: An Historical and Contemporary Survey of Homosexuality in Britain (London: 
Heinemann, 1970), pp. 40 
35 For Singapore, see the Crawfurd Treaty of 1824 and the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824; for Hong Kong, see the Treaty of 
Nanking of 1842 
36 Alok Gupta, “”Sodomy,” Colonialism, and Codification” in This Alien Legacy: The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British 
Colonialism (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), pp. 15 
37 Ibid., pp. 21 
38 See Section 61 of the Act, downloadable at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1861/100/pdfs/ukpga_18610100_en.pdf 
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Ordinance based on the 1861 English Offences Against the Person Act,39 and those of Singapore 
when the Straits Settlement Law of 1871, mirrored on the IPC, was passed.40 
 In Singapore, the application of criminality specifically to same-sex acts between males 
occurred much later. Only in 1938 did the Straits Settlement Legislative Council of Singapore 
enact Section 377A that in today’s amended version reads as follows: 
 Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission of, or 
procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any act of gross 
indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to 2 years.
41
 
Curiously, even though Section 377A singled out males, this law was based off Henry 
Labouchere’s 1885 amendment in the Singapore Legislative Assembly to “a Bill to make further 
provision for the protection of women and girls, the suppression of brothels and other 
purposes.”42 Equally curious is the similarly gendered language of Section 51 of Hong Kong’s 
1865 Offences Against the Person Ordinance: 
 Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the commission of, 
or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of any act of gross 
indecency with another male person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour triable summarily, and 
shall be liable to imprisonment for 2 years.
43 
 The gender-specific approach of these legislations dating back to the second half of the 
19th century during Queen Victoria’s reign is “probably connected with the fact that when the 
relevant provisions were drafted, public acknowledgement of female sexuality would have been 
                                                          
39 Carole J. Petersen, “Values in Transition: The Development of the Gay and Lesbian Rights Movement in Hong Kong,” in 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 337 (1991): 339 
40 Dominic Chan, “Oral Sex – A Case of Criminality or Morality?” Singapore Law Gazette, September 2004, 
http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2004-9/Sep04-feature2.htm 
41 The full text of the Singapore Penal Code is available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;ident=e40d5913-c2dc-4284-bf68-
eb315c55c8fa;page=0;query=CompId%3Ae40d5913-c2dc-4284-bf68-eb315c55c8fa;rec=0#legis 
42 Lynette J. Chua, “Saying No: Sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code,” in Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2003): 216 
43 The full text of the 1865 Ordinance is available at http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/items/show/2864 
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unthinkable in English society.”44 The prevalent perception of female passionlessness45 in 
Victorian England was coupled with the Queen’s personal belief that same-sex acts between 
females simply did not exist in her empire.46      
Needless to say, modern understandings of sexuality in general and female sexuality in 
particular have disproved and discarded much of the Victorian assumptions. Out of this post-
Victorian milieu flowed a certain libertinism that today increasingly sees the criminalization of 
same-sex acts between only males to be legally problematic and morally suspect. It was precisely 
such an attitude which contributed to the repeal of Hong Kong’s Britain-inspired sodomy laws in 
1991 after more than a century. The same attitude was at work in England and Wales when they, 
in 1967, became the first two countries within the United Kingdom (UK) to repeal sodomy laws 
with the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act which declared that “a homosexual act in private 
shall not be an offence provided that the parties consent thereto and have attained the age of 
twenty-one years.”47 
The decriminalization in parts of the UK came ten years after the famous Wolfenden 
Report was released by the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution. The Report 
recommended, in paragraph 62, that “homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in 
private be no longer a criminal offence.”48 However, the Macmillan government was reluctant to 
implement the recommendations of the Report as they pertained to homosexuality because “on 
that subject public opinion was divided and strong views were held; and there was not sufficient 
                                                          
44 Nicholas Bamforth, Sexuality, Morals, and Justice: A Theory of Lesbian and Gay Rights Law (London: Cassell, 1997), pp. 25  
45 For more information on the concept of passionlessness and, more generally, Victorian sexual mores, see Nancy F. Cott, 
“Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790 – 1850,” in Signs: Women in Culture and Society 2 
(1978): 219 – 236   
46 Lynette J. Chua, “Saying No: Sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code,” in Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2003): 212 
47 The full text of the relevant chapter of the 1967 Act is available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/60/pdfs/ukpga_19670060_en.pdf 
48 The full text of the Report is available at 
http://www.humandignitytrust.org/uploaded/Library/Other_Reports_and_Analysis/Wolfenden_Report_1957.pdf 
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measure of public support for the Committee’s recommendations to justify the Government in 
introducing legislation to give effect to them… [Consequently,] there was no early prospect of 
Government legislation to amend the law relating to homosexual offences.”49 
Crucially, the rationale offered for the continued criminalization of homosexual acts 
made no reference to any notion of fundamental human rights or the UK’s obligations to relevant 
regional or international treaties. Instead, “public opinion” was held up as the sole legitimate 
arbiter of the legality of homosexual acts; supposedly, decriminalization of homosexual acts 
required nothing more and nothing less than unambiguous “public support.” The distance 
between relying on “public opinion” as a legitimate justification for the criminalization of 
homosexual acts and invoking cultural arguments to resist legal equality is a small one. 
Indeed, while the Macmillan government did not disingenuously argue that 
homosexuality was somehow fundamentally alien to English culture, however defined, the 
governments of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan would, in a supremely ironic development 
of post-colonialism, blithely contend that homosexual acts had to be criminalized or at least 
strongly tabooed because homosexual rights (and presumably homosexuality itself) “are a 
Western issue.”50 
  
 
 
                                                          
49 The full text of the relevant Cabinet Memorandum (82nd Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting held on 28th November 1957) is 
available at http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-128-31-cc-57-82-82.pdf 
50 Baden Offord and Leon Cantrell, “Homosexual Rights as Human Rights in Indonesia and Australia,” in Journal of 
Homosexuality 40 (2001): 233 
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III. Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Legality of Homosexuality Globally: 
 Many factors commingle in any given society to determine the degree to which 
homosexuality is either accepted or rejected. Most importantly, the set of factors is not static but 
dynamic; all socio-political and legal mores evolve. While not intended to be exhaustive, the 
following has been posited by a group of scholars who undertook a global cross-national study to 
be the key factors:51 
1. Type of Legal System: homosexuality is more likely to be illegal in, on the one hand, 
common law or Islamic countries, and, on the other, countries where there is a sizeable 
(and influential) Catholic population 
2. Democratic Conditions and Political Opportunity Structure for Minority Population: 
homosexuality is more likely to be illegal in less democratic countries or/and countries 
with fewer number of women in the legislatures 
3. The State of Economic Development and Modernization: homosexuality is more likely to 
be illegal in countries with low(er) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
4. Globalization: homosexuality is more likely to be illegal in countries less exposed to or 
plugged into the process of globalization 
This paper will argue that in general these factors do not adequately or accurately explain 
the state of affairs in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan regarding homosexuality. In fact, it is 
arguable that only in the case of Singapore does a combination of the third and fourth factors—
broadly understood as economic imperatives—contribute to an understanding of the city-state’s 
current live-and-let-live attitude toward homosexuality. Even then, economic imperatives faced 
                                                          
51 Victor Asal, Udi Sommer, and Paul G. Harwood, “Original Sin: A Cross-National Study of the Legality of Homosexual Acts,” 
in Comparative Political Studies 46 (2013): 320 – 351  
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by the small Southeast Asian island only explain a part of the story; as this paper will try to 
show, the political imperatives of a one-party state prove to be more decisive. 
In the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the factors enumerated above are even less 
directly relevant. This paper will argue that it is ultimately the complex relationship between, on 
the one hand, these two countries and on the other, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter 
referred to as “China”) that generated a set of social and political forces that tended in 
homosexuality-affirming directions. In particular, Hong Kong’s move to decriminalize same-sex 
acts two years after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was chiefly influenced by the 
prospective transfer of its sovereignty from Britain to China in 1997 while Taiwan’s continued 
embrace of certain positive gay and lesbian rights is inextricably bound up with its geopolitical 
need to gain international recognition in the context of China’s coercive and widely-accepted 
“One China” policy.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                                                          
52 For more information on the “One China” policy, see Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—
Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf, accessed March 16, 2014. 
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IV. Chinese Culture and “Homosexuality”: 
It is not uncommon for homosexuality-denying advocates in any of the three countries to 
ground their opposition in Confucian ethics or more broadly, “Chinese culture.” For example, 
during the July 1991 Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) debate to decriminalize private 
homosexual acts between consenting male adults, LegCo Member Pang Chun-Hoi claimed that 
“homosexuality (buggery) is against the Chinese tradition [and] is considered evil by Chinese.” 
He further mentioned that for the LegCo to think that the majority of Hong Kongers—Chinese 
by descent—supported decriminalization would be nothing but “a rape of public opinion.”53 
In the case of multiracial Singapore, direct references to Chinese culture are eschewed in 
favour of a more syncretic and thus politically palatable paradigm and rhetoric of “Asian 
values.” For example, Member of Parliament (MP) Baey Yam Keng, otherwise seen as a liberal 
vis-à-vis his parliamentary colleagues54 criticized the information regarding homosexuality on 
the Singapore Health Promotion Board’s (HPB) website for lacking “the Asian values of 
family.”55 In essence, however, “Asian values,” as the Singaporean authorities have defined and 
articulated them, are virtually indistinguishable from a particular interpretation of Confucianism 
and communitarianism in which the primacy of the whole rather than the individual is 
sacrosanct. In fact, the first of five “Shared Values” of Singapore promulgated by then-Deputy 
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Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1990 reads “Nation before community and society above 
self.”56 
The employment by homosexuality-denying advocates of arguments ostensibly situated 
within or derived from Chinese culture is, to understate, disingenuous. First, “Chinese culture” is 
a loaded term which necessarily eludes simple characterizations; it is certainly neither 
homogeneous nor unequivocal regarding its views on homosexuality, among many other issues. 
Moreover, given the breathtakingly long history of China, to speak of a monolithic and 
homophobic “Chinese culture” is almost definitely an exercise in selective memory and 
arbitrariness; different dynasties and different time periods within a given dynasty treated 
homosexuality differently.57 Thus, if indeed a generalization can be made in this regard, it ought 
to be that, absent “mythological or metaphysical support for treating homosexual acts as 
especially abominable”58 as per the Judeo-Christian tradition, “Chinese traditional culture did not 
react to homosexuality with the same disgust that has pervaded Western Christian responses to 
same-sex love.”59 
Second, to invoke “Chinese culture” in general and Confucianism in particular to justify 
resistance to modern expressions of homosexuality is a classic example of anachronism; the term 
“homosexuality” was only coined in 1869 by Karl-Maria Kertbeny as “a Greco-Latin 
                                                          
56 Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng, “Experimenting with Religious Values as Asian Values,” in State, Society, and Religious 
Engineering: Towards a Reformist Buddhism in Singapore (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), pp. 217 
57 For more information on the history of same-sex male relations in China, see Bret Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve: The 
Male Homosexual Tradition in China (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) 
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59 Wu Cuncun, “Historical Origins of Qing male homoerotic sensibilities,” in Homoerotic Sensibilities in Late Imperial China 
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neologism… that became a widely adopted appellation for same-sex behaviour.”60 According to 
Michel Foucault: 
The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a 
childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet 
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was 
unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions 
because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face 
and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away… The sodomite had been a 
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.
61                 
In other words, to assert that homosexuality as it is understood today was uniformly 
condemned by a timeless “Chinese culture” is to purvey a partisan idealization and not a faithful 
representation of how homoerotic sensibilities had been interpreted throughout Chinese history.    
Third, even if it is somehow arguable that “Chinese culture” presents a veritable and 
vigorous argument against the social and legal acceptance of homosexuality in the 20th and 21st 
centuries, such a stance has severe limits. In critiquing the tepid argument that “there should be a 
ceiling placed on local sexual orientation rights because sexual orientation is a sensitive cultural 
issue that should be moulded to fit the local culture of Hong Kong,” the Hong Kong Human 
Rights Monitor reasoned why such culturally relativistic logic is faulty: “The UN Human Rights 
Committee has explicitly denounced culture as a defence to violations of sexual orientation 
rights [and] the human rights regime’s purpose it to protect minorities, especially when they are 
marginalized by local majoritarian cultures.”62 
                                                          
60 Robert Aldrich, “Gay and Lesbian History,” in Gay Life and Culture: A World History, edited by Robert Aldrich (New York: 
Universe Publishing, 2006), pp. 11 
61 Michel Foucault, “The Repressive Hypothesis,” in The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, translated by Robert 
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 43. 
62 The full text of the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor presentation, “Sexual Orientation and Human Rights in Hong Kong,” at 
the 2005 Sexual Minorities Forum is available at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/images/issues/20_5_05/SMF%20Paper%206-
2005.pdf 
21 
 
In sum, “one must problematize the way Chineseness is essentialized through selective 
historicism (for instance, picking and choosing what aspects of Chinese culture and history to 
include or exclude) and the conflation of various strands of cultural lineages (for example, 
appropriating fundamentalist Christian values and rewriting them as Asian ones) all for a specific 
cultural political agenda: in this case, the perpetuation of homophobic laws.”63 
Given its role as “a complete way of life”64 in Chinese society since the end of the Han 
Dynasty approximately in 220, the Confucian strand of Chinese cultural lineage deserves special 
attention. The worldviews posited in the Analects, a compendium of philosophies attributed to 
Confucius and his contemporaries, are characterized by “primitive rites of worship of ancestors 
[and] a hierarchy based upon the sanguinity of patriarchy”65 although strictly speaking, these 
rites concerned “a whole set of unwritten laws, ceremonies, proprieties, and shamanistic 
practices bearing upon the people.”66 
Of note is that neither Confucius nor neo-Confucian moralists “single[d] out 
homosexuality when they advocated sexual restraint.”67 For instance, the prohibitions on 
officials engaging in sodomy or homoeroticism in both the Ming and Qing dynasties “must be 
understood in the context of parallel bans on officials visiting prostitutes.”68 Indeed, “Qing law 
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treated all rapists comparably, regardless of the gender of their victim. Instead, punishment relied 
entirely on consideration of the age of the victim and the degree of violence perpetrated.”69 
It appears, then, that “as long as familial obligations were not neglected,”70 “‘sexual 
encounter between two men is never immoral per se; homosexuality does not violate the 
Confucian ethical system as long as it respects the boundaries of propriety assigned to it—the 
hierarchies of the social pact.’ In some ways it is love that is most problematic… for passion is 
more threatening to the social order, more likely to lead to… transgression[s].”71 
However, as benign or as indifferent as this reading of Confucianism regarding 
homosexuality is, it is inarguable that “the traditional Chinese cosmology of yin-yang was 
gradually abandoned in the name of (Western) modernity, and replaced by a biological 
determinism that medicalizes a woman’s body as weak and passive, in contrast to the male body, 
which is said to be active and strong.”72 
The notion of an ironclad gender binary is a conceptual prerequisite for unidirectional 
and anatomically-based concepts of sexuality; sex is no longer contextual and relational but 
mechanical and biological. This “Westernization of Chinese sexual categories and a 
Westernization of the overall terms of discourse about homosexuality”73 was accompanied by 
“imported Western intolerance of homosexuality.”74 China in the throes of colonial exploitation, 
domestic ferment, and violent nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries would 
eventually elide her own traditional tolerance and appreciation of same-sex eroticism and link 
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homosexuality with, among others, Western corruption, bourgeois degeneration, and capitalistic 
immorality. In sum, and with utmost irony, “the Western vision of the decadent Orient is now 
matched with a parallel Chinese view of the exotic and depraved Occident.”75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75 Ibid., pp. 171 
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V. Hong Kong: 
Majority support for continued criminalization of same-sex acts 
 Although Hong Kong’s legislature “generally followed England’s lead with respect to 
statutory reform… there was initially very little call in Hong Kong to follow the English example 
of decriminalizing homosexual acts.”76 This apparent lack of public support for the 
decriminalization of homosexual acts persisted into the 1980s when the Law Reform 
Commission (LRC) of Hong Kong, in compiling its 1983 Report on Laws Governing 
Homosexual Conduct found that an overwhelming majority (71%) of those surveyed favoured 
the continued criminalization of homosexual acts.77 Nevertheless, the Commission recommended 
that “consensual sexual conduct between not more than two males in total privacy, and provided 
both are over 21 years of age” should be decriminalized although it was quick to highlight that 
such a recommendation “does not imply any moral approval of homosexuality.”78 
 The reasons behind the Commission’s recommendation are as follows: “there are no 
“victims” of private consensual sex between two adult men; the law should not unnecessarily 
interfere in private lives; anti-homosexuality laws are difficult to enforce and unlikely to deter 
homosexual conduct; and such laws caused gay men substantial anxiety because they made gay 
men vulnerable to blackmail and other forms of abuse and exploitation.”79 
Even though Hong Kong, by virtue of the UK’s ratification of the ICCPR in 1976, was 
expected to protect her citizens from “arbitrary or unlawful interference with [their] privacy, 
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family, home or correspondence,”80 the Hong Kong LegCo decided stick to the legal status quo 
and not implement the Commission’s recommendation regarding private homosexual acts 
between consenting male adults. Expectedly, strong “public opinion” against homosexuality was 
cited as the justification.81 
Homosexuality-denying public opinion grew stronger when the moral panic regarding 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) 
ensued following Hong Kong’s first reported cases of HIV infection in 1984 and AIDS in 
1985.82 Although not a single one of the ten “principle arguments… in favor of preserving the 
status quo” included in the 1983 LRC Report addressed the issue of sexually transmitted 
diseases,83 the then-Attorney General of Hong Kong, Michael Thomas, revealed in 1985 that the 
HIV/AIDS scare “must be a factor” in considering any legal changes to the criminality of same-
sex acts.84 
The implicit conflation of homosexuality with HIV/AIDS was despite the fact that in 
1985, of the three reported cases of AIDs and 46 reported cases of HIV, an overwhelming 
majority of them was due to the “transfusion of blood or blood products in Hong Kong before 
HIV screening became available” and not due to the phenomenon termed “men having sex with 
men.”85 Another less-acknowledged factor would be the Executive Council’s concern with not 
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complicating the then-ongoing negotiations between the UK and China regarding the 
controversial transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the former to the latter.86 
Consequently, on the issue of implementing LRC’s recommendation to decriminalize 
same-sex acts, the Executive Council of Hong Kong dragged its feet. When questioned by pro-
decriminalization quarters, the government avoided “any clear answer except the usual 
bureaucratic jargon that other priority prevailed.”87 In June 1988, roughly five years after the 
LRC Report was released, the Hong Kong public was presented not with a legislative initiative to 
decriminalize same-sex acts but a Consultative Paper titled “Homosexual Offences: Should the 
Law be Changed?” which sought public feedback on the following three options: first, to make 
no changes to the law; second, to decriminalize private homosexual acts between consenting 
adults; and third, to reduce the penalties for private homosexual acts between consenting 
adults.88       
 The 1988 Consultative Paper echoed some of the observations of the 1983 LRC Report. 
In particular, the Consultative Paper underlined that the law against homosexual acts in private 
was “difficult to enforce” since “few cases come to the attention of the police.”89 It went on to 
state that enforcement of the law “would require enormous police resources and a complete 
disregard for an individual’s right to privacy.”90 More contentiously, perhaps, it suggested that 
because “the present law is not important in preventing family or marital breakdown… 
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[Decriminalizing homosexual acts in private between consenting adults] would therefore be 
unlikely to place significant new pressures on family life.”91 
The Consultative Paper further mentioned that there is “insufficient evidence to conclude 
that the control of AIDS would be either helped or hindered if [laws against homosexual acts] 
were changed.”92 It also noted that other laws exist to “safeguard standards of public decency”93 
and that because homosexual acts are criminalized, gay and lesbian Hong Kongers “all live 
under the threat of being derided and ostracized by the community as a result of prosecution and 
conviction.”94 
It is noteworthy that the Consultative Paper was, on the whole and notwithstanding its 
declared neutrality, a progressive one. Although it articulated the arguments both for and against 
the LRC Report, there was a subtle yet discernible impulse to humanize homosexuals and to 
problematize the dominant heteronormative discourses surrounding the issue. In a way, this was 
unsurprising because the Consultative Paper built upon the findings of the LRC Report. 
In another way, however, the Consultative Paper could be perceived as a sign that the 
government was itself hoping to mold and move public opinion in the direction of supporting the 
decriminalization of homosexual acts. The latter perception is bolstered by the fact that in the 
same year, the government withdrew Secretariat Confidential Circular No. 106/8295 which 
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declared, among other homosexuality-denying things, that “no known homosexual should be 
appointed to the Hong Kong civil service, irrespective of rank or grade.”96 
 The government’s stance regarding homosexuality in 1988, then, appears to be 
substantially different from that merely a decade ago. In the late 1970s, in response to claims by 
a prominent European solicitor who was then serving a three-year jail term for abusing young 
boys that he “was in a position to name many “highly placed” homosexual men,”97 the 
government established a Special Investigation Unit (SIU) within the Criminal Investigation 
Department of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force to investigate allegations of homosexuality 
generally and the “procuration of youth for homosexual abuse”98 particularly. 
The raids by SIU officers on establishments with a primarily gay and lesbian clientele, 
and homes of suspected high-ranking homosexual civil servants sparked fears of “a witch-hunt 
of homosexuals.”99 Unsurprisingly, the work of the SIU came under widespread criticism, 
including by the Commission of Inquiry established in the wake of the death, in January 1980, of 
John MacLennan, a Scottish Inspector with the Royal Hong Kong Police who had been 
investigated by the SIU; one of the Commission’s conclusions being that some members of the 
SIU “were improperly motivated or had breached approved standards”100 in their investigation 
work. 
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Transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China 
To reiterate, the Hong Kong government’s stance regarding homosexuality appeared to 
be softening throughout the 1980s. In this regard, it is arguable that the 1985 Joint Declaration of 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (hereafter “The 
Joint Declaration”) influenced attitudes within the government. The Joint Declaration “created 
great concern in Hong Kong because most people would have preferred that Hong Kong remain 
a British-dependent territory.”101 
Indeed, “the people of Hong Kong generally feel very uncertain about their future as 
change appears inevitable. The middle class would prefer to emigrate, given the opportunity. At 
least they would like their children to study and settle abroad, so that the next generation will not 
be affected by the current uncertainties. Many have also begun to invest in real estate in 
countries like Canada and the United States.”102 
Specifically, a March 1982 survey commissioned by the Hong Kong Reform Club103 
revealed that 85% of respondents preferred Hong Kong to be under British administration, that 
is, to remain a British colony or become a British trust territory104 after 1997 when the 99-year 
rent-free lease of the New Territories under the 1898 Convention between the United Kingdom 
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and China, Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory expires.105 In a larger survey 
carried out in the same year, 80% and 82% of respondents expressed concern over the future of 
Hong Kong after 1997106 and considered the expiration of the Convention as “a problem which 
needed solving.”107 
In a different survey of policymakers the private sector in the same year, “over 71% of 
the responding companies revealed that uncertainty over the political status of Hong Kong had 
an adverse effect on their investment planning, ranging from freezing their business expansion 
plans in Hong Kong to diverting some of their capital to other places.”108 
The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and majority support for human rights protection 
  The decided sense of uncertainty and apprehension of the Hong Kong people regarding 
the transfer of the territory’s sovereignty to China was dramatically intensified by the Tiananmen 
Square incident of June 1989 in which communist authorities in Beijing forcibly dispersed 
peaceful student protesters and in so doing, drew sharp criticisms from the international 
community for gross human rights violations. In the aftermath of the bloody military crackdown 
in Tiananmen, confidence of the Hong Kong people in their government and the future of the 
territory sank “to an all-time low.”109 Indeed, the Tiananmen Square incident “changed the whole 
course of events”110 regarding public and governmental attitudes toward the necessity and 
urgency of human rights legislation.  
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In an effort to allay public concerns and rebuild confidence in Hong Kong’s future, the 
government announced its intention to introduce a domestic human rights legislation, a draft of 
which was released for public consultation in March 1990.111 While the idea of having domestic 
legislation to augment the ICCPR had been discussed previously, “most notably during local 
discussion of the first draft of the Basic Law in 1987… public support for such a Bill [only] 
increased” in 1989.112 
In June 1990, Mrs Selina Chow, then a member of the Hong Kong LegCo and convener 
of the LegCo ad hoc group for the Bill of Rights, summed up the mood and motivations 
regarding the said bill: 
I am convinced a Bill of Rights, however imperfect, will boost the confidence of our 
people. It should be seen as an integral part of our democratic evolution. I cannot agree with the 
thinking that we should let well alone. Is that not a familiar tune that is re-sung from time to time 
whenever there is call for changes in our system? The fundamental flaw in the "Don't rock the 
boat" school of thought is a failure to recognize that the boat is rocking. We wish it to be clear of 
rough waters, but in order to do so we have to steer it, not to let go at the helm. We cannot 
ignore the fact that we are in a time of change, and it is our job to see to it that Hong Kong be 
given the right system of checks and balances to handle that change. At the same time, we must 
heed the calls from our community to progress cautiously, taking a step-by-step approach, and 
explaining our case to China, who has repeatedly assured us that she is prepared to respect our 
autonomy. But progress we must. This Bill is a component of that progress.113 
 In the course of the LegCo debate over the Bill of Rights, numerous other LegCo 
members echoed the themes embedded in the above excerpt. Although the Tiananmen Square 
incident was only mentioned once (by LegCo member James David McGregor) throughout the 
debate, China was mentioned 47 times, suggesting the enormous extent to which the Bill was 
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introduced because of the widespread concerns surrounding Hong Kong’s imminent return to the 
mainland. 
Discarding diplomatic niceties, LegCo member Dr. Leong Che-Hung pointedly remarked 
that “allowing such a Bill is… the best and the simplest thing China can do for Hong Kong 
people and to maintain Hong Kong people's confidence… [Because] things are not going to be 
the same after 1997 unless something is done to ensure that they will.”114 
Government support for decriminalization of same-sex acts as part of human rights 
 Although the legality of homosexual acts was not immediately linked to the Bill of 
Rights, it was clear that opponents of the decriminalization of same-sex acts knew what the 
implications were should the Bill of Rights be enacted. For instance, David Cheung Chi-Kong, a 
LegCo member who would go on to oppose the Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1991 which 
decriminalizes homosexual acts, warned during the debate on the Bill of Rights of “the possible 
abuse of human right [in] the form of excessive freedom under the spirit of the Bill.”115 After 
approximately another year of revisions and deliberations, primarily about when the Bill should 
kick into operation after its enactment in the LegCo, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 
was enacted on 6th June 1991. 
Against the government’s initial proposal for the Bill to have a one-year freeze period 
while extant legislation was updated for compliance, the finalized version of the Bill came into 
operation on 8th June 1991 and marked, for Hong Kong’s gay rights movement, “a 
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watershed”116: Article 14 of the Ordinance—Protection of privacy, family, home, 
correspondence, honor, and reputation—declared the following: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
117
 
 Crucially, Section 3 of the Ordinance “obligated courts to interpret preexisting legislation 
in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights, and if this proved impossible, to declare the 
offending provision invalid.”118 Furthermore, taking cue from the landmark Dungeon v. United 
Kingdom ruling in 1982 by the European Court of Human Rights which prioritized an 
individual’s privacy rights,119 the Hong Kong government knew that the continued 
criminalization of same-sex acts between males in private violated the Ordinance and would not 
withstand judicial action in the new legal regime.120 
In July 1990, when the Bill of Rights was simultaneously on the LegCo’s agenda, the 
Chief Secretary, Sir David Robert Ford, moved a motion to debate the issue of homosexuality in 
which he predicted that the criminalization of private same-sex acts between consenting adults 
would soon “be open to challenge under the Bill of Rights endorsed by [LegCo].”121 He also 
prefaced his support to decriminalize private same-sex acts between consenting adults an 
invocation of classical liberal principles: 
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 What is at issue today is not simply the decriminalization of private homosexual acts 
between adult males. What is at issue is a matter of principle: the dividing line between the 
moral and the legal codes, where the individual's right to privacy begins and the Government's 
duty to interfere ends. This is an important principle. Its implications extend beyond the 
immediate subject. And it is imperative that in addressing it we clear our minds of 
preconception, prejudice and emotion. If we do not, if we allow personal morality alone to 
dictate the scope of criminal law, then there is a real danger that the law will become an 
instrument for imposing moral values rather than preserving public order and protecting the 
citizen.
122
 
In a thinly-veiled threat to those who would oppose the motion and thus the 
decriminalization of same-sex acts, and prefer for the courts to interpret the constitutionality of 
criminalizing same-sex acts should such complaints be lodged, the Chief Secretary had this to 
say: 
To borrow the words of an eminent French statesman (Jean Baptiste Co Hert): "If you 
enact a law and do not enforce it, you are condoning what you condemn." A vote against the 
motion before this Council will be a vote against condoning and in favor of enforcement. And 
henceforth the Government would be obliged to seek out and prosecute all, both high and low, 
who infringe against this law, despite all the problems I have mentioned.
123
 
In effect, the Hong Kong government championed, as it were, the cause and “made it 
extremely difficult for the LegCo to vote against its motion” to debate the issue of 
homosexuality. Indeed, the motion passed with 31, 13, and six LegCo Members supporting, 
opposing, and abstaining respectively.124 Throughout the course of the next year, the government 
drafted the Crimes (Amendment) Bill on which LegCo eventually passed in July 1991. The 
Crimes (Amendment) Bill repealed Sections 49 through 53—the section of “Abominable 
Offences”—of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance; same-sex acts in private between two 
consenting adults (defined as 21 years of age and above) of full mental capacity is no longer a 
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crime. Under the amended penal code, the following types of male same-sex acts remained 
crimes: 
• Section 118C: Homosexual buggery with or by man under 21 
• Section 118F: Homosexual buggery committed otherwise than in private 
• Section 118G: Procuring others to commit homosexual buggery125 
It should be remarked that the legal age-of-consent for opposite-sex acts was 16 in 1991; 
men between 16 and 21 were thus effectively singled out to be the only class of persons “prone 
to emotional and material dependence,” or “a limited and possibly distorted knowledge of 
homosexual activity.” The laughable logic notwithstanding, decriminalization of private same-
sex act between consensual adults after 126 years was a watershed development in and of itself. 
Beyond the negative right of decriminalization 
 The courts in Hong Kong have played an important role in widening the application and 
practical effects of the landmark 1991 Bill of Rights and Crimes (Amendment) Bill. In 2005, 20-
year-old William Roy Leung became the plaintiff in a successful legal challenge of primarily 
Section 118C which, according to Leung’s lawyers, adversely affects his ability to engage in 
“any fulfilling relationships… for fear of prosecution.”126 The legal victory was chiefly based on 
one’s right to privacy and, more importantly, the principle of equality.127 
When the Hong Kong Court of First Instance ruled that the differing age-of-consent 
between a private, consensual heterosexual and a homosexual intercourse was unconstitutional, 
the Hong Kong government—led by Donald Tsang, a devout Catholic—appealed, arguing that 
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judicial review should not have been granted Leung in the first place since Leung was not 
actually being prosecuted for committing same-sex relations deemed illegal. 
 To the government’s argument that for the courts to hear Leung’s case would be to 
dabble in a mere “academic exercise”128 and “irreversibly open the floodgates for persons to 
allege [other] statutory offences [to be] somehow unconstitutional,”129 the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal countered in its September 20, 2006 ruling that first, the legislation under scrutiny affects 
not just the Applicant but many persons in the same position as him; second, the questions raised 
in the appeal regarding the constitutionality of the laws affecting homosexuals are of significant 
public interest; third, the resolution of these questions involve pure points of law, unencumbered 
with the need to make findings of fact; and forth, where the constitutionality of laws (all the 
more so if they are criminal laws) is involved, the court should be more eager to deal with the 
matter—put bluntly, if a law is unconstitutional, the sooner this is discovered, the better.130 
 While truly far-reaching positive rights such as same-sex civil unions or marriage are still 
elusive in Hong Kong, public opinion regarding the place of gay and lesbian Hong Kongers is 
rapidly changing. A 2006 survey—the first since Hong Kong became part of China in 1997— 
commissioned by the Home Affairs Bureau reported that 49% of the respondents either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that homosexuality contradict morals of 
community while 38.9% either agreed or strongly agreed.131 More dramatically, in the same 
survey, 88.8% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that work 
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ability is not directly related to homosexuality while only 3% either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed.132 
In addition, a vast majority of the respondents (between 60% to 80%) found it either 
acceptable or strongly acceptable to have gays and lesbians as colleagues, neighbors, workplace 
superiors, friends, and teachers; the percentage of acceptability dipped, however, when it 
pertained to having gays and lesbians as family members.133 Crucially, 61.6% of the respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of 
sexual orientation would encourage more homosexual behavior134 and only 23.5% of the 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that existing means of public education were 
sufficient to address the problems of discrimination faced by gay and lesbian Hong Kongers.135   
 In 2009, the LegCo included same-sex couples in the scope of the amended Domestic and 
Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance.
136 The Ordinance, first enacted in 1986, 
previously only offered legal redress for victims of sexual violence in opposite-sex relationships. 
Even though this amendment merely recognizes the inescapable reality that same-sex partners do 
cohabit in Hong Kong despite the illegality of same-sex civil unions or marriage, opponents of 
the amendment decried that the widening of the Ordinance’s coverage may lead to “potential 
negative impacts… on the existing institution of marriage”137—a coded way of speaking against 
homosexuality and its supposedly monstrous discontents. 
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 At present, notwithstanding the fact that discrimination against non-heteronormative 
individuals at work is a widely documented phenomenon,138 laws banning discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation are “still a long way off.”139 Most of the inertia afflicting legislative 
efforts to enact anti-discrimination laws originates from the understandable though exaggerated 
fear of those who see in these laws an assault on their religious freedom to “preach according to 
their doctrines and beliefs” as well as a harbinger of one, more thoroughgoing positive gay and 
lesbian rights such as marriage equality and two, a dramatic surge in the numbers of complaints 
and lawsuits that government agencies and the courts will have to face.140 At present, there are 
no plans to conduct public consultation regarding anti-discrimination laws. 
 Currently under Chief Executive Leung Chun-Ying, the Hong Kong government claimed, 
as do all conservative forces around the world regarding same-sex rights, in 2013 that because of 
the “highly controversial” nature of the issue, public debate and legislative action should be 
avoided.141 This stance is increasingly problematized not just by homosexuality-affirming 
activists but indeed by even the highest echelons of Hong Kong’s famed financial and business 
sectors which are cognizant of the adverse economic implications of a homosexuality-denying 
legal framework and social climate, especially for “an international financial and commercial 
center” such as the Special Administrative Region (SAR). This echoes what America’s Human 
Rights Campaign’s first national corporate spokesperson and Goldman Sachs’ chief, Lloyd 
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Blankfein, said: “America’s corporations learn long ago that equality is just good business and is 
the right thing to do. Join me and a majority of Americans who support marriage equality.”142 
To that end, Hong Kong played host to the first ever Out on the Street summit in the 
region during which senior business executives and government representatives like Dr. York 
Chow, chair of the SAR’s Equal Opportunity Commission, discussed how best to address gay 
and lesbian issues in their workplaces and beyond.143 The ostensibly economic rationale for 
greater legal recognition of gay and lesbian rights is matched by a rapidly shifting public 
opinion: in the latest survey of its kind, the Hong Kong University found that “74% of the public 
supported granting same-sex couples either all or some of the rights that are accorded to 
heterosexual couples.”144 
Despite these shifts in public opinion, Chief Executive Leung made no mention of the 
issue of same-sex rights in his 2014 Policy Address. Absent a dramatic reconfiguration of the 
electoral landscape in which active support for gay and lesbian rights will yield material electoral 
gains, it is unlikely that Leung will prioritize the issue. As Hong Kong’s most unpopular Chief 
Executive since the island’s sovereignty was transferred to China,145 Leung has his plate 
absolutely full; given that marriage equality does not, at present, move and affect as many as say, 
Hong Kong’s stubbornly growing income inequality and soaring housing prices, the agenda for 
positive gay and lesbian rights are unlikely to witness much government attention or backing. 
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VI. Singapore: 
The dynamics of a one-party soft authoritarian state 
 At first glance, Ian McKellen, the international Hollywood celebrity, would appear an 
unlikely authority in a discussion regarding Singapore’s regulation of her citizens’ (homo)sexual 
behaviours. However, during an interview with Reuters in 2007 when the award-winning artist 
visited Singapore as part of the Royal Shakespeare Company’s touring production of “King 
Lear” and “The Seagull,” McKellen revealed a nuanced grasp of not only the issue of 
criminalizing male same-sex acts in Singapore but indeed of the broader political milieu in which 
local discourses and activism on the issue occur: 
"It would be impertinent of me to comment on Singapore society but this happens to be a 
law that I find personally offensive and I don't think it should be on the statute books because it 
inhibits my free behavior as an openly gay man. I feel free to comment on behalf of people who 
do have to suffer laws which the British Empire invented and left behind. It's easier for a 
foreigner to come in and speak to truth as he sees it."
146 
Elsewhere in the interview, in response to the point that Lee Kuan Yew, “Singapore’s 
first premier and its guiding spirit ever since,”147 had said that male same-sex acts could not be 
decriminalized until the views of the country’s conservative majority evolved, McKellen said: 
"Yes. Then he must expect gay people not to come here, he must expect gay people to 
emigrate, he must expect no company to have their gay employees work here. Under that 
pressure he will change the law, I guarantee you. I'll take a bet."
148 
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 As an openly gay individual, McKellen is understandably sympathetic to the movement 
of repealing Section 377A of the Southeast Asian city-state’s Penal Code which, as mentioned 
earlier, criminalizes “any act of gross indecency”149 between two males regardless of the ages or 
consent of the parties involved, and the location of the act. Importantly, the law does not define 
the precise meaning of such acts, relying instead on an open-ended understanding: In 1995, then-
Chief Justice Yong Pung How stated that “what amounts to a grossly indecent act must depend 
on whether in the circumstances, and the customs and morals of our times, it would be 
considered grossly indecent by any right-thinking member of the public.”150 Nevertheless, based 
on past convictions, such acts are “usually fellatio and masturbation.”151 
 There are at least three significant takeaways from McKellen’s comments. First, they 
underscore the fact that the criminalization of homosexual acts in Singapore is a legacy of British 
colonialism. Section 377A was written into Singapore’s legal framework by unelected officials 
who were not, by any stretch of the imagination, acting as democratic representatives of the local 
populace. Indeed, such legislation regulating the expressions of an individual’s sexuality in 
Singapore conforms to the colonialist logic, traceable to the 19th century, which mandated that 
the native customs of Britain’s disparate colonies needed to be corrected and civilized, that is, 
Christianized.152 The colonialist impulse to control native populations—the “domestications of 
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the exotic,” as Edward Said memorably said153—manifested in the policing of the colonial 
subject’s behaviour and body. 
 Second, McKellen draws attention to the illiberal political system and climate that make 
it difficult for a citizen to “speak to truth as he sees it.”154 Whatever else it may be, this political 
landscape is one which the PAP has given birth to, claimed credit for, and unapologetically 
nurtured and defended over more than five decades of uninterrupted parliamentary hegemony.155 
Critically, it has also been strenuously justified by the state as a fundamental factor contributing 
to Singapore’s rapid industrialization and economic growth “from Third World to First”156 
despite being located in a hostile and economically backward region.157 Accordingly, Lee Kuan 
Yew opined that should Singapore “move towards a two-party system, [she would be] destined 
for mediocrity [and] become nothing more than a dull little red dot.”158 Put differently, political 
paternalism, with its attendant curbs on individual civic freedoms and rights that are otherwise 
considered quotidian in Western liberal democracies, is justified in the name of cultural 
relativism, technocratic competence, economic growth, and social stability. 
 Third, and related to the above, is McKellen’s prediction that the PAP will only expend 
its political capital among Singapore’s vocal homosexuality-denying conservatives and repeal 
Section 377A should the continued criminalization of male same-sex acts carry material 
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economic liabilities. Put differently, repealing Section 377A is unlikely to be borne out of an 
ontological recognition on the part of the governing elites that homosexuality is both harmless 
and innate. Rather, male same-sex acts will be decriminalized if and only if the resultant 
economic and political benefits for Singapore and the PAP respectively outweigh those derived 
from a deeply heteronormative and patriarchal public culture amendable to “the transfer of the 
paternal signifier from the family to the state, the metaphor of state as family then rendering 
“natural” an “omnipresent government.””159 
 In sum, McKellen outlines some of the most salient features characterizing the political, 
cultural, and discursive framework that has hitherto kept Singapore, in the words of Lee Kuan 
Yew, “a few respectable steps behind”160 the world regarding its legal classification of male 
same-sex acts as criminal. Elaborating on the logic of keeping pace with but not exactly 
matching external developments on this front, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated the 
following during the October 2007 parliamentary debate on the Penal Code (hereafter “the 2007 
debate”): 
 When it comes to issues like the economy, technology, education, we better stay ahead of 
the game, watch where people are moving and adapt faster than others, ahead of the curve, 
leading the pack.  And when necessary on such issues, we will move even if the issue is 
unpopular or controversial… We moved on IRs
161
 - it is a difficult subject, not everybody 
supports the Government, but we decide this is right, we move. On issues of moral values with 
consequences to the wider society, first we should also decide what is right for ourselves, but 
secondly, before we are carried away by what other societies do, I think it is wiser for us to 
observe the impact of radical departures from the traditional norms on early movers.  These are 
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changes which have very long lead times before the impact works through, before you see 
whether it is wise or unwise.  Is this positive?  Does it help you to adapt better?  Does it lead 
to a more successful, happier, more harmonious society? So, we will let others take the lead, we 
will stay one step behind the frontline of change; watch how things work out elsewhere before 
we make any irrevocable moves.
162
  
Notably, Lee Hsien Loong chose to situate the question of decriminalization in solely 
utilitarian terms, that is, whether or not allowing male same-sex acts will enhance Singapore’s 
success, happiness, and harmony. Consequently, the Prime Minister  made no mention of legal 
equality in his speech; de jure legal acceptance was deemed to be too herculean a leap for the 
majority of Singaporeans. 
Supporting continued criminalization of male same-sex acts on this basis, MP Dr. 
Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim claimed that there was a “loud and clear” message that Singapore is 
“not ready for open homosexuality acts to be part of our way of life yet.”163 Notwithstanding Dr. 
Ibrahim’s misguided and thus unfortunate characterization of what Section 377A actually 
proscribes—even non-open “homosexuality acts” are considered crimes under the current law—
his posture of conservatism was one that most PAP MPs struck during the debate.164 
Situating “Asian Values” between the pragmatic and the prudish 
 Animating the conservatism on display during the 2007 debate is, as mentioned earlier, a 
curious brand of so-called “Asian values” through which claims to international human rights 
norms are defanged and confrontational activism, severely frowned upon. In 1993, then-Foreign 
Minister Wong Kan Seng told the international audience gathered at the World Conference on 
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Human Rights in Vienna that while “all cultures aspire to promote human dignity in their own 
ways… the hard core of rights that are truly universal is perhaps smaller than we sometimes like 
to pretend.”165 
Wong then proceeded to embellish his larger point of cultural relativism thus: 
“Singaporeans, and many people in many other parts of the world do not agree, for instance, that 
pornography is an acceptable manifestation of free expression or that homosexual relationships is 
just a matter of lifestyle choice. Most of us will also maintain that the right to marry is confined 
to those of the opposite gender.”166 Consequently, passionate efforts to “impose any political 
pattern or societal arrangement” were described as impractical and immodest “zealotry.”167 
 If Wong’s counsel for pragmatism and gradualism in 1993 was directed squarely at 
foreign human rights activists given to articulate and habitual criticisms of Singapore’s illiberal 
political system, as Home Affairs Minister in 2009 during the “AWARE saga,”168 Wong had a 
completely different audience to admonish: 
The way for homosexuals to have space in our society is to accept the informal limits 
which reflect the point of balance that our society can accept, and not to assert themselves 
stridently as gay groups do in the West. We live in a diverse, multi-racial and multi-religious 
society.  Every group, whether religious or secular, has to live and let live, to exercise restraint 
and show mutual respect and tolerance. If any group pushes its agenda aggressively, there will 
be strong reactions from the other groups.
169
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In other words, while open to reviewing its stance on the criminality of male same-sex 
acts in the future when public opinion becomes more homosexuality-affirming, the PAP 
government will not brook the militant brand of gay activism otherwise common in many 
Western countries. Incidentally, and notwithstanding this particular articulation of government 
policy and supposed cultural conservatism, Singapore’s first public and open-air congregation of 
homosexuality-affirming individuals in Hong Lim Park170 was held just one day after Wong 
issued the statement on the “AWARE saga.” 
Social movement, economic imperatives, and de facto tolerance 
Known as Pink Dot, this annual non-profit event very rapidly became and continues to be 
the city-state’s most prominent example of (non-confrontational) gay activism. In 2013, it drew a 
crowd of over 21,000 people (the largest ever civil-society gathering),171 received sponsorships 
from major finance and multinational corporations with offices in Singapore, and was widely 
reported in the international media.172  
This example illustrates at least three paradoxes in the Singaporean state’s regulation of 
homosexuality: first, while resisting a culture of polling public opinion,173 the government 
nevertheless confidently maintains that the silent majority prefers for the continued 
criminalization of private male same-sex acts; second, while resisting a culture of strident gay or 
human rights activism, the government nevertheless trusts that mainstream opinion will shift; 
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third, while resisting a culture of Western liberalism and sexual liberation, the government 
nevertheless midwifed, quite deliberately, “Asia’s new gay capital.”174 
Just as Rome was not built in a day, “Asia’s new gay capital,” too, took time and effort. 
Lee Hsien Loong’s comment during the 2007 debate that “de facto, gays have a lot of space in 
Singapore… there are gay bars and clubs… they do not have to go underground… we do not 
proactively enforce Section 377A on them”175 demonstrates the government’s calibrated policy 
shifts over time: since Ng Huat v. Public Prosecutor in 1995, “there has… been no reported case 
where 377A has been used for purely non-consensual homosexual activity.”176  
In July 2003, then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong surprised even the homosexuality-
affirming community when he revealed that the Singaporean civil service “now allows gay 
employees into its ranks, even in sensitive positions.”177 More remarkably, perhaps, was Goh’s 
reasoning that “some people are born that way… We are born this way and they are born that 
way, but they are like you and me.”178  
To be sure, the evolution of the government’s view toward and use of Section 377A was 
not for the noble purpose of legal equality. As suggested earlier, state tolerance for homosexuals 
has largely been prompted by and contingent on the perceived economic benefits associated with 
making Singapore more attractive for global talent and capital—key prerequisites for the 
actualization of Singapore’s vision to become “a leading Asian leisure destination” by 2015179 as 
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well as “a global arts city” able “to join New York and London in the top rung of cultural 
cities.”180  
Indeed, in the same interview referenced earlier, then-Prime Minister Goh intimated that 
“the change in policy [was] inspired at least in part by the desire not to exclude talented 
foreigners who are gay.”181 In this regard, Singapore’s governing elites show themselves to be 
faithful and competent students of Richard Florida’s influential urban studies theory of “The 
Rise of the Creative Class”: 
The economic need for creativity has registered itself in the rise of a new class… the 
Creative Class… whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or new 
creative content… these people engage in complex problem solving that involves a great deal of 
independent judgment and requires high levels of education or human capital... the key 
difference between the Creative Class and other classes lies in what they are primarily paid to 
do: to create and have considerably more autonomy and flexibility than [either the Working 
Class or the Service Class.]
182
 
More pertinently, Florida wrote that “a place that welcomes the gay community 
welcomes all kinds of people… gays can be said to be the “canaries of the Creative Age”… a 
place that is open and tolerant [is] important to high-tech workers and Creative Class people 
[who] all want places where they can fit in and live as they please without raising eyebrows.”183 
Lee Kuan Yew’s observation, then, that “if [Singapore is] unable to keep pace with the rest of 
the world, [she] will not be able to attract talent… and talented people will not want to go to a 
repressive place”184 conforms neatly to Florida’s insights. 
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This apparent obsession with revamping Singapore’s international image from that of a 
clean, safe, and straitlaced “Nanny State”185 to one of a vibrant, cosmopolitan, and exciting 
global city186 is very much generated by the government’s clear-eyed assessment that as a small 
and open economy, Singapore has no choice but to imagine “new growth paths less vulnerable to 
external business cycles than the export-driven model on which it had relied.”187 To the extent 
that these “new growth paths” rely heavily on the Creative Class, the government has vowed to 
“do ‘whatever it takes’ to attract talent.”188 As a journalist with the city-state’s biggest English 
daily, The Straits Times, pithily noted at the end of her editorial commenting on the 
aforementioned change in the civil service: “Remember, this is not about gay rights. This is 
about economic competitiveness.”189 
Conservative religious-moral entrepreneurs and the “silent majority” leitmotif 
If, for all the reasons cited above, the government appears to be tacitly heading in a more 
homosexuality-affirming direction, and creating, as it were, gay-friendly “facts on the 
ground,”190 the liberalization project is not without its critics who, by and large, interpret it 
through sanctimoniously religious lenses. For example, “Pentecostals have joined conservative 
evangelicals, with Pentecostals from mainstream denominational churches often taking the lead, 
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to oppose liberalizing moves by the state to recreate Singapore as a global city with a 
cosmopolitan and open culture, which they see as encouraging sinful behavior detrimental to the 
well-being of Singapore society.”191 
Being the first time in Singapore’s independent history in which the presence of 
homosexual Singaporeans was openly recognized,192 the 2007 debate nevertheless brought deep-
seated and religiously-mediated homophobia to the fore as when then-Nominated Member of 
Parliament (NMP)193 Thio Li-Ann, in arguing for the continued criminalization of male same-sex 
acts, pontificated the following: 
377A serves public morality; the argument from community reminds us we share a way 
of life which gives legal expression to the moral repugnancy of homosexuality. Heterosexual 
sodomy, unlike homosexual sodomy, does not undermine the understanding of heterosexuality as 
the preferred social norm. To those who say that 377A penalizes only gays, not lesbians, note 
there have been calls to criminalize lesbianism too. Public sexual morality must buttress strong 
families based on faithful union between man and wife, the best model for raising children. The 
state should not promote promiscuity nor condone sexual exploitation. New section 376D 
criminalizes the organization of child-sex tours. Bravo!
194
 
Most arrestingly, perhaps, is her description that “anal-penetrative sex is inherently 
damaging to the body and a misuse of organs, like shoving a straw up your nose to 
drink.”195 Speaking immediately after Thio, MP Alvin Yeo, a Christian, described the lobbying 
efforts against Section 377A to be “minority views” that were unapologetically “vocal… 
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articulate… high profile,” and thus callous toward the “views of the vast and silent segments of 
the population.”196 
Another Christian MP, Indranee Rajah, a rose to argue that “the stance which the 
Government is taking is, in fact, an exact reflection of what Singapore society in general 
thinks… And I think that many liberal groups have, for a long time, thought that the Government 
was exaggerating the extent of the conservatives in Singapore, but that is not so.”197 Such 
assertions that Singapore remains, at its core, a deeply conservative society “uncomfortable with, 
even troubled by, homosexual behavior”198 continue to claim rhetorical and ideological validity 
by references to two surveys—Our Singapore Conversation Survey (OSCS) in 2013 and Institute 
of Policy Studies Survey on Social Morality in 2014—that supposedly show Singaporeans to be 
in overwhelming support of retaining Section 377A. 
The first survey showed that 35% of the respondents strongly “reject gay lifestyles,” 12% 
of the respondents “reject gay lifestyles,” 27% of the respondents were neutral, 14% of the 
respondents “accept gay lifestyles,” and 12% of the respondents strongly “accept gay 
lifestyle.”199 The second survey reported that 78.2% of the respondents said sexual relations 
between two adults of the same sex were either always or almost always wrong while 72.9% said 
the same of gay marriage.200 
Glaringly, these surveys do not actually poll Singaporeans on their opinions regarding the 
retention or repeal of Section 377A, that is, the legality of being rather than behaving gay. 
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Equally unfortunate is the surveys’ employment of terminologies—for example, “the gay 
lifestyle”—pregnant with and indeed originating from the rightwing conservative Christian 
movements in the US.201 Furthermore, the inclusion of the question regarding same-sex marriage 
when same-sex acts themselves remained crimes punishable by a jail term is curious at best and 
cynical at worst for it plays straight into the moral panic and dystopian fear-mongering that 
homosexuality-denying voices like Thio’s have traditionally amplified in their efforts to uncover 
a sinister and so-called “homosexual agenda” that will inexorably normalize other sexual acts 
such as bestiality, incest, and pedophilia.202 
Political imperatives of a hegemonic ruling party 
A critical interpretation of such survey results must at least be cognizant of the mammoth 
yet naturalized ideological strictures that the PAP has, over the past five decades in power, 
assiduously put in place in Singapore’s public discourse and imagination; “ideological hegemony 
[works in tandem with delivering] economic growth and needs to be continually produced”203 to 
ensure the centrality and longevity of a dominant and no-nonsense state, that is, the PAP-
governed state. The “entrenched [and] dependable practice” of “generating narratives of crisis at 
intervals”—eloquently captured in Lee Hsien Loong’s warning that “overnight, an oasis may 
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become a dessert”204—is married with the PAP’s self-conception that it alone can secure 
Singapore’s prosperity and be all things to all people.205 
To be sure, these narratives of crisis are fueled by threats from within and without; 
Singapore’s multiracial and polyglot population206 reliably affords the state with a credible script 
that dramatizes the supposed inevitability of internecine racial strife in the event that an 
alternative political order with looser societal arrangements emerges. Consequently, rather than 
blurring ethnic divisions, Singapore’s “nation-building strategy—particularly since the 1980s—
has been to retain [and] exaggerate[e] them.”207 
In a word, “more often than not, [racial] diversity has been seen as a threat.”208 Beyond 
race, another fault line that the PAP is wont to highlight is that between, on the one hand, liberal 
Singaporeans characterized as “‘creative’ subjects whose horizons lie further away” and, on the 
other, conservative Singaporeans characterized as “‘loyal’ subjects whose horizons are local.”209 
Wong Kan Seng, during the “AWARE Sage” warned: 
The debate on Sec 377A of the Penal Code showed how the homosexuality issue 
polarized our society. Advocates on both sides were passionate and vocal. In the recent AWARE 
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tussle, homosexuality was clearly a major issue to both sides.  This is unproductive and divisive. 
Our society will not reach consensus on this issue for a very long time to come.
210
 
Presumably, the “both sides” Wong referred to are the homosexuality-affirming liberals 
and the homosexuality-denying conservatives. Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean said as 
much when he listed “sexual orientation” as one of the many new possible fault lines besieging 
Singapore.211 Relatedly, Wong’s assertion that consensus will elude Singaporean society “for a 
very long time to come” was calculated to reinforce, yet again, the need for Singapore to have “a 
strong enough government to coordinate the separate advantages that can be reaped from [both 
sides], while keeping the peace between them.”212 
In other words, through particular interpretations of domestic affairs, in this instance the 
“AWARE Saga,” the PAP deftly arrogates unto itself the seemingly indispensable role of an 
impartial ring-holder that will ward off “intemperate activism [threatening Singapore’s] social 
fabric.”213 Indeed, “in communicating reasons against change, the government has sometimes 
insinuated that the conservative majority of Singaporeans are ignorant, close-minded, prudish… 
intolerant… parochial—but, it claims, there is absolutely nothing [it] can do about it.”214 Put 
differently, by locating itself as merely a helpless mediator between competing groups, the PAP 
shields itself from blame and simultaneously deepens Singaporeans’ instincts that the party is the 
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only reason preventing society—constructed as fundamentally and forever fractious—from 
descending into a Hobbesian abyss. 
A critical appreciation of the aforementioned surveys’ results, notwithstanding their 
leading and thus problematic phraseology, therefore needs to recognize that the sustained state-
led production and performance of differences (and their penalties)215 has contributed to 
Singaporeans’ almost kneejerk aversion to deviance. To ignore this would be to ignore the fact 
that Singapore and Singaporeans, as “creation[s] of the PAP, [have been] made to its image and 
likeness”216 and that, paraphrasing Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci, “powerful individuals and 
groups tend to monopolize the interpretation of cultural norms and manipulate them to their own 
advantage.”217 
While the percentage of Christians in Singapore’s population has grown from 14.6% in 
2000 to 18.3% in 2010218—the single biggest increase in any major religion—and assuming, 
incorrectly, that all Christians support Section 377A, it would nevertheless be simplistic to argue 
that it is this trend of heightened religiosity that keeps Section 377A on the books; Singaporean 
society is not unique in containing groups with drastically different cosmologies according to 
which they live their lives and make sense of the world. The stark difference between Singapore 
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and many other countries that have decriminalized same-sex acts, then, is the dynamic of a one-
party soft-authoritarian state intent on not rocking any boats in service of its political longevity 
and the supposed attendant benefits. 
To conclude, Singapore’s continued criminalization of sex between consensual adult 
males in private is, above all else, linked to the political imperatives that the PAP faces in its 
effort to retain power and control in Singapore’s increasingly variegated political landscape. 
“Not… truly concerned with morality,” the PAP is instead worried that “a polarized population 
would less likely vote consensually and repeatedly for the same party.”219 
To be sure, and to its credit, by permitting “social change…without any alteration to 
formal laws affecting same-sex sexual conduct or expression,”220 the PAP is arguably 
anticipating the likely global and generational shifts in attitudes regarding homosexuality. Yet, 
given that the PAP’s traditionally heteronormative worldview has been so diffused and 
popularized—a hegemon in the Gramscian sense—over the course of its uninterrupted half-a-
century rule, it is not unthinkable that what had been historically relaxed and tolerant societal 
attitudes regarding homosexuality have in fact hardened. Put differently, even if the PAP is 
indeed as prescient and pragmatic as Lee Kuan Yew’s statements over the years imply, it has 
bred a populace that now expects the state to be all things to all people, including therefore 
playing the contradictory roles of, on the one hand, conservative moral policemen and, on the 
other, progressive and cosmopolitan elite.   
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VII. Taiwan: 
Japanese colonial legacy 
 In contrast to both Hong Kong and Singapore, homosexual acts were never criminalized 
in Taiwan because of its different colonial history; Taiwan was never a British colony. 
Consequently, its moral and cultural ecology was never suffused with the strongly homophobic 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, control over Taiwan (along 
with the Penghu Islands and parts of the Liaodong Peninsula) was ceded over from the Qing 
Empire in China to the Empire of Japan.221 Notably, Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan was the 
first time the entire island has been governed as a single entity.222 
For the next half a century, Japan would fastidiously remake Taiwanese society to 
resemble, if only superficially, herself; “conscious efforts were made to wipe out Chinese 
influence in the cultural sphere,” including populating the island with Japanese immigrants223 
and governing Taiwan according to the Meiji Constitution.224 Accordingly, a sense of how Japan 
perceived and treated homosexuality would be helpful to a discussion regarding homosexuality 
in Taiwan and, in particular, why homosexuality was not criminalized both in colonial and post-
colonial Taiwan.   
 Like Chinese culture, Japanese culture did not historically conceive of a “normative 
connection… between gender and sexual preferences because all men, whether samurai, priest, 
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or commoner, were able to engage in both same- and opposite-sex affairs.”225 More generally, 
“the expression of private sexual practice has tended to be overlooked by both state and religious 
authorities”226 in Japanese history. Again, analogous to China, especially during the Yuan and 
Ming Dynasties (1264 to 1644),227 male homoeroticism in traditional Japan was often an 
expression and extension of one’s social standing and power. For example, in Japan, “elite men 
were able to pursue boys and young men who had not yet undergone their coming-of-age 
ceremonies” in the context of a code of ethics termed nanshoku (male eroticism) and shudo (the 
way of youths).228 
 Just as China under Mao Zedong’s and the Communist Party’s authoritarianism was 
“eager to instill social and moral order”229—revolutions depend on stable and reproductive 
family units—“Japan’s descent into militarism in the early 1930s saw the government tighten its 
hold on sexual discourse and practice.”230 Ironically, however, imperial Japan’s large-scale 
preparations for the war effort actually created many more opportunities for greater intimacy 
between men who, because of the military draft, were placed in an environment privileging 
homo-social brotherhood for the purposes of inspiring valiant and selfless military exploits.231 
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Unlike its Allied counterparts, homosexuality was not perceived by the Japanese military 
establishment as an enervation or an aberration meriting swift and unequivocal condemnation.232 
 This backdrop of, at best, colonial acceptance or, at worst, colonial indifference regarding 
homosexuality helps explain why Taiwan never had laws explicitly targeting same-sex relations. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan’s current reputation for having “the most openly gay life in the Chinese 
world”233 was anything but inevitable. Indeed, Taiwan under the autocratic rule of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) from 1949 to her democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s was in 
many ways intolerant of homosexuality although to be sure “there has never been systematic 
persecution of homosexuals.”234 
Kuomintang’s authoritarian project and intolerance of homosexuality 
 This state-led intolerance of homosexuality in the early period of Taiwan’s history was 
intimately bound up with the KMT’s political project of consolidating its grip on power over the 
island, continuing the abortive fight against the so-called “Communist Rebellion”235 in 
continental China, and “constructing Taiwan as a model Chinese province.”236 Consequently, the 
KMT under strongman Chiang Kai-Shek sought to aggressively “heterosexualize” Taiwanese 
society.237 For example, Article 66 of the Law for Punishment of Police Offences prohibiting the 
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“wearing of odd/inappropriate outfits” was “primarily directed against men with long hair or 
women wearing trousers.”238 
In addition, “Confucianism was invoked essentially as a set of stripped down ethical 
values which had a specific role in the service of the state. As a generalized moral philosophy, 
Confucianism entailed… respect for social authority.”239 This emphasis on Confucianism served 
the KMT in much the same way as it did the PAP in Singapore. In both cases, a one-party state 
needed an ostensibly indigenous ideology to naturalize the omnipresence of the state. 
 In this climate, homosexuality was marginalized and rendered invisible. Only rarely did 
homosexuality make it into the interstices of public discourse and even then, homosexuality was 
portrayed negatively as a “mental illness” or a “relatively rare occurrence… in Chinese 
societies.”240 Furthermore, even “regulations governing censorship did not mention same-sex 
contacts.”241 Police raids of locales popular with homosexuals and the subsequent 
sensationalistic media coverage were regular affairs.242 
To be sure, this silencing of homosexuality-affirming voices was part of the larger 
illiberal political regime sustained by Martial Law that, among other things, “banned formation 
of any new political parties, gave the military wide censorship powers and was used by military 
courts to convict thousands of civilians of sedition and other crimes.”243 In aggregate, because 
the period between 1950s and early 1970s was especially unconducive for any form of civic 
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activism, “oppositional and marginalized voices”244 of which homosexuality-affirming ones are a 
part were, for all intents and purposes, silent. 
 In the late 1970s, with the demise of Chiang Kai-Shek, political strictures relaxed slightly 
in response to an emboldened and enlarged Taiwanese urban middle class which was no longer 
singularly concerned with economic livelihood245 but rather was “blatant in [its] demand for 
democracy and political diversity.”246 This trend persisted into the 1980s during which “the first 
cracks began to appear in the vast control structure of the KMT.”247 Notably, in 1986, the 
Democratic People’s Party (DPP) was founded as Taiwan’s first major opposition party and one 
that enjoys the support of the rapidly proliferating civil society groups. In 1987, Martial Law was 
lifted. In 1988, hitherto suffocating government regulations and censorship over print 
publications eased.248 
Political liberalization after Martial Law  
 While homosexuality-affirming voices existed frailly on the margins in general and in 
literature in particular before the late 1980s,249 a coherent and active social movement—the 
Tongzhi movement250—working for greater legal and political rights for homosexuals in Taiwan 
came of age only with the broader political liberalization of Taiwanese society. This transition 
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from “dictatorship”251 to democracy provided the Tongzhi movement with “a new catalogue of 
social values… based on pluralism and individualism.”252 Universities, in particular, played a 
critical role in the dissemination of queer theories and the congregation of like-minded activists. 
Other feminist and HIV/AIDS self-help groups also contributed to the visibility and vigor of the 
Tongzhi movement in Taiwan. 
 When Chen Shui-Bian, against “angry rhetoric from Beijing,” became the first non-KMT 
President of Taiwan in a “truly historic” episode in the island’s democratization,253 
multiculturalism was promulgated as “the basic national policy.”254 Chen’s election and 
subsequent “frequent references to human rights” were encouraging signs for Tongzhi groups, 
one of which—the Taiwan Gay Hotline—became, during Chen’s administration, “the first 
national group to register legally with the Ministry of Interior.”255 
Barely six months into his presidency, Chen held a meeting with international activists 
and representatives of the tongzhi groups in Taiwan.256 In November 2003, Taipei, the island’s 
capital city, became the first territory in the Chinese world to host a state-sanctioned gay Pride 
parade during which then-Taipei Mayor and current President Ma Ying-Jeou was quoted as 
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saying: “I want to tell our homosexual friends: If you live in Taipei, you won’t be discriminated 
against.”257 
Geopolitical imperatives in the face of “One China” policy 
 Animating the efforts to project Taiwan in general and Taipei in particular as gay-
friendly is the island’s arguably existential geopolitical need to “gain global legitimacy”258 and 
positively differentiate itself from an undemocratic but incomparably stronger China which 
insists that Taiwan is “a renegade province”259 belonging to China. While Taiwan is by no means 
unique in drumming up domestic developments for foreign consumption,260 there is a 
particularly performative aspect of Taiwan’s pursuit of democracy in general and homosexuality-
affirming policy stance in particular. For example, in his inaugural address in 1996 after 
Taiwan’s first presidential elections, President Lee Teng Hui declared the following:  
Today, we in Taiwan firmly tell the world, with great pride and self-confidence: We now 
stand on the apex of democratic reform and will remain there resolutely. We have proved 
eloquently that the Chinese are capable of practicing democracy; we have effectively expanded 
the influence of the international democratic camp and made significant contributions to the 
cause of freedom and democracy. Therefore, this gathering of today does not celebrate the 
victory of any candidate, or any political party for that matter. It honors a triumph of democracy 
for the 21.3 million people. It salutes the confirmation of freedom and dignity—the most 
fundamental human values—in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area.
261
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In his inaugural presidential address in 2008, President Ma Ying-Jeou adopted a similar, 
performative tone: 
This remarkable experience has let Taiwan become "a beacon of democracy to Asia and 
the world." We, the people of Taiwan, should be proud of ourselves. The Republic of China is 
now a democracy respected by the international community.
262
  
 The enthusiastic embrace of democracy by Taiwan’s ruling elites is, as suggested above, 
a deliberate foreign policy strategy to sustain and cement America’s commitment to the 1979 
Taiwan Relations Act
263 and to expand its international space. It must be recalled that the Carter 
Administration’s decision to normalize relations with China was a “massive blow” to and 
“traumatized” Taiwan.264 To be sure, this does not mean that Taiwan’s democracy is in any way 
a farce calculated only to convince the world to offer sympathy and support for the island’s bid 
for either continued autonomy or, more radically and unrealistically, independence. 
Nevertheless, the politics of gay and lesbian rights in Taiwan cannot be understood without an 
appreciation of the larger geopolitical environment in which Taiwan exists. 
While Taiwan has had an internationally ambiguous status since 1971 when China 
officially replaced it in the UN, it was not until the spectacular rise of China in the early 1980s as 
well as the end of the Cold War that its national security as an illiberal polity became truly 
fragile: just as Taiwan’s dependence on the US became even more acute with a militarily and 
economically resurgent China, its undemocratic system hinders the sustenance of eager 
American support. Therefore, in order to consolidate its position under the American security 
umbrella, it “has repositioned itself as a political and economic model, one that espouses a 
                                                          
262 The full text of President Ma’s address is available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/2008/05/21/157332/Full-text.htm 
263 The full text of the Taiwan Relations Act is available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hr2479/text 
264 Shelley Rigger, “American is Boring at Night,” in Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (Plymouth: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 111 
65 
 
democratic political order and a dynamic market economy… making it more difficult for China 
to use force to unite Taiwan with the mainland.”265 
As Harvard Professor Joseph Nye puts it, “as long as Taiwan stands for democracy and 
human rights, [selling out Taiwan for something the US wants from China] will be impossible in 
American political culture.”266 Put differently, Taiwan must position itself in such a way as to 
enable the American political, military, business, and academic establishment to continually 
declare, without serious contradictions, the following: “Our enduring relationship under the 
Taiwan Relations Act represents a unique asset for the United States and is an important 
multiplier of our influence in the region. This friendship is grounded in history, shared values, 
and our common commitment to democracy, free markets, rule of law, and human rights.”267 
Accordingly, both the DPP and the KMT have pursued policies that, at least on surface, 
afforded greater legal equality to gays and lesbians. For instance, in 2001, the Ministry of Justice 
produced a draft of the Basic Law on the Protection of Human Rights in which an article 
stipulated that homosexuals shall be allowed to have families and legally adopt.268 Two years 
later, the Executive Yuan proposed legislation—Basic Law on Human Rights—to permit 
marriage between same-sex couples which would have made Taiwan indisputably the most 
homosexuality-affirming place in the whole of Asia.269 
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Indeed, Chen’s desire to “make [Taiwan] a pioneer in the progressive introduction of 
new, so-called ‘third-generation’ human rights” would have “grant[ed] rights that many Western 
countries had not approved.”270 However, the radical scope of the draft of the Basic Law on 
Human Rights—for example, Article 2 concerned Taiwan’s right of self-determination while 
Article 5 called for the abolishment of the death penalty, above and beyond the requirements of 
the ICCPR—coupled with the fact that the KMT still had control of the Legislative Yuan meant 
that the Chen administration’s attempts to ratify a human rights legislation was, if not doomed 
from the outset, destined to face vigorous opposition.271 Ultimately, the draft Basic Law on 
Human Rights never survived backroom dealings, public murmurings, and legislative opposition; 
it was neither debated nor voted on during Chen’s first term.272 
However, shortly after Chen won the controversial 2004 presidential elections by a razor-
thin margin,273 his administration successfully passed the Gender Equity Education Act that 
aimed to “promote substantive gender equality, eliminate gender discrimination, [and] uphold 
human dignity.” To that end, it stipulated that schools “shall respect the gender temperaments 
and sexual orientation of students, faculty and staff,” and shall “affirmatively provide assistance 
to students who are disadvantaged due to their gender or sexual orientation in order to improve 
their situation.”274 
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In 2007, the Employment Service Act of 1992 was amended to include birth place, age, 
and sexual orientation as grounds on which discrimination is illegal275 while the Gender Equality 
in Employment Act of 2002 was amended to stipulate that “employers shall not discriminate 
against applicants or employees because of their gender or sexual orientation in the course of 
recruitment, screening test, hiring, placement, assignment, evaluation and promotion.”276 
The same trend of institutionalizing human rights continued after May 2008 when KMT’s 
Ma was inaugurated as Taiwan’s third democratically elected President. In December 2008, 
while delivering the keynote address at the Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award 
Ceremony, Ma reiterated his campaign promise to have the ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC)277 ratified, noting that while 
Taiwan had signed unto both Covenants before losing its UN membership, its subsequent 
diplomatic isolation and domestic Martial Law conspired to prevent their ratification in the 
Legislative Yuan.278 Notably, the ratification of both Covenants was one of Chen’s legislative 
priorities during his two terms although the DPP’s lack of a legislative majority from 2000 to 
2008 proved to be veritable obstacles for Chen’s agenda. 
Ratification of international covenants 
On March 31, 2009, the Legislative Yuan ratified both the ICCPR and the ICESC, as well 
as mandated all governmental entities to review laws, regulations, directives and administrative 
measures within their respective jurisdiction with the aim of bringing them into conformance 
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with the covenants. On December 10, 2010, the ICCPR and ICESC came into force, and the 
Presidential Office Human Rights Consultative Committee was established to monitor and 
ensure the steady implementation of the terms of both Covenants.279 
From 2011 to 2013, the Ma administration prepared detailed reports regarding the 
implementation of both Covenants in Taiwan and invited a group of independent experts to 
review these reports. The expert group published their report—Review of the Initial Reports of 
the Government of Taiwan on the Implementation of the International Human Rights 
Covenants—in March 2013 and noted that it was “deeply impressed by the dramatic progress 
that has been made since 1987, when Taiwan began to emerge from a long and dark period of 
martial law.”280 
The report was effectively a vote of confidence for how the Taiwanese government has 
dealt with the legal rights of gays and lesbians in that it only called for greater awareness of 
transgenderism which, strictly speaking, is unrelated to homosexuality, and expressed concern 
that “as in many other countries, [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons] 
frequently face…marginalization…by large parts of the general population.”281 In other words, 
the report suggests that the key challenge for the gay and lesbian community in Taiwan is not so 
much state-sanctioned discrimination as it is societal attitudes that unfortunately though 
unsurprisingly take a longer time to evolve and often persist despite homosexuality-affirming 
policy stances by the government. 
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Conservative pushback 
Of course, many in the homosexuality-affirming camp would challenge the suggestion 
that public attitudes stand resolutely in the way of marriage equality which is seen as the 
ostensibly ultimate positive gay and lesbian right. While various survey results “show a constant 
increase in the support for same-sex marriage,”282 the legislative move by various DPP 
lawmakers allied with civil society organizations such as the Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil 
Partnership Rights in late 2013 to amend the Taiwan Civil Code283 governing marriage—
currently defined as between a man and a woman—provoked a fierce backlash that saw over 
150, 000 take to the streets of Taipei to protest against legalizing same-sex marriage.284 
Many legislators were present at the anti-same sex marriage demonstration including 
Wang Chien-shien, President of Taiwan’s Control Yuan, a governmental organ charged with 
impeachment, audit, censure and other functions. Wang was quoted to have said that a 
referendum should be held on the matter given its far-reaching implications.285 At present, while 
the draft ‘Marriage Equality’ bill has passed the first reading in the Legislative Yuan on 
Christmas Day 2013, its fate is inconclusive. Still, the preceding discussion shows why Taiwan 
is the most homosexuality-affirming of the three case studies. 
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VIII. Conclusion: 
 This paper has shown that, despite the apparent historical, geographic, cultural, 
demographic, and economic similarities, gay and lesbian rights in Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Taiwan have developed largely independently and rather differently. To reiterate, the 
discussion’s emphasis for Hong Kong and Singapore has been on the politics regarding negative 
gay and lesbian rights, that is, the decriminalization of consensual same-sex acts between adults 
in private. This emphasis is informed by history—both Hong Kong and Singapore inherited 
sodomy laws from the British—as well as the indisputable importance of the legality of same-sex 
acts for any subsequent (or consequent) positive gay and lesbian rights to even be possible. 
    To the chagrin of Singaporean conservatives, economic imperatives confronting the 
city-state have drastically expanded the space within which gay and lesbian Singaporeans can 
somewhat freely live their lives. Hong Kong, too, has evolved with the times but in a much more 
official fashion: in 1991, the sodomy laws were repealed; in 2006, the differing age-of-consent 
between heterosexual and homosexual intercourse was equalized (to 16); and in 2009, same-sex 
couples were included under the amended Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence 
Ordinance that gestures, however obliquely, toward greater legal recognition of their existence 
and rights as Hong Kong citizens. 
While it was the then-impending return to China that jolted Hong Kong into adopting a 
comprehensive human rights bill that incidentally brought down its sodomy laws, today, both 
Singapore and Hong Kong—economic competitors across various sectors—see gay and lesbian 
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rights in a largely conservative if economically pragmatic light: each holds off making 
irreversible legislative changes wherever possible, lest, in the case of Singapore, a polarized 
society threatens the PAP’s hegemony and, in the case of Hong Kong, a radically liberal and 
rights-based society unnecessarily complicates relations with Beijing. 
Facing a different and arguably more unforgiving set of geopolitical conditions, Taiwan 
has emerged from the shadows of her Martial Law years with a renewed determination to, as it 
were, make up for lost time in her democratic and human rights development. Her need to 
become a model 21st century nation—democratic, well-governed, cosmopolitan, capitalistic—
deserving of continued American security guarantee in the context of the “One China” principle 
has greatly aided the development of gay and lesbian positive rights. It bears recalling that the 
island’s Japanese colonial masters never criminalized same-sex acts; negative gay and lesbian 
rights were technically always present. Still, the debate on same-sex marriage wages on in the 
context of a Taiwan drawn inexorably into China’s enormous economic orbit. 
In the final analysis, Singapore stands out as a particularly conservative outlier—as far as 
its legal classification of same-sex acts goes—among the three case studies. Of relevance is the 
fact that among the three case studies, Singapore is the only sovereign nation with official 
membership in various regional and international organizations. Since membership in such 
organizations can, at least in theory, mediate domestic legal and political situations, it is useful to 
briefly discuss how Singapore’s involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) further hinders the advancement of gay and lesbian rights in the city-state. 
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Historically speaking, regional organizations like the European Union (EU)286 have 
played critical roles in the advancement of both positive and negative gay and lesbian rights in 
the West. For instance, the landmark 1981 Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom ruling by the 
Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights successfully pressurized Northern 
Ireland’s government to bring its laws in conformity with the other countries within the UK.287 
Additionally, membership conditionality of the EU has been very useful in steering, as it were, 
“national developments in the candidate countries in order to assure that the new-comers comply 
with the pre-accession requirements of article 6(1) EU, including inter alia, democracy, the rule 
of law, and the protection of human rights (gay rights included).”288 
 Beyond the legal recourse and suasion associated with regional organizations, they also 
enable domestic non-governmental organizations “to bring pressure on their states from outside 
[and tap on] new resources, opportunities, and alternative targets.”289 This is especially crucial 
when the domestic political opportunity structure is particularly inhospitable to gay and lesbian 
activism, as was the case in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s because of, among others, the 
continued salience of class, the somewhat closed nature of British political system, and the lack 
of elite allies.290 
 In this light, it is noteworthy that “there is currently no Asia Pacific human rights treaty, 
no regional human rights commission, and no regional human rights court that is even remotely 
                                                          
286 For more information on the EU, visit http://europa.eu/index_en.htm 
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comparable to the institutions in the European, Inter-American, and African systems.”291 
Nevertheless, a sub-regional human rights body was established by ASEAN in 2009. Named the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the primarily promotional 
and advisory body produced the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD)292 that was 
however roundly criticized by homosexuality-affirming groups such as the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission: 
As the most recent in the region to develop a rights monitoring body, the drafters of the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration are out of step with developments in the broader human 
rights arena. Thus far they have missed the opportunity to adopt a progressive vision of human 
rights. Instead, AICHR has blamed religion and culture for holding back its commitment to 
recognizing that all human beings have human rights and that LGBT rights are human rights.
293 
 Separately, the UN Human Rights Council released an Open Letter to the drafters of the 
AHRD which strongly implied that the document fell short of international standards.294 In 
addition, the US State Department expressed its deep concern that the AHRD “could weaken and 
erode universal human rights and fundamental freedoms as contained in the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights.”295 
Indeed, several months before the AHRD was adopted on November 19, 2012, criticisms 
regarding the drafting process of the Declaration had already surfaced: over 130 regional human 
rights organizations issued a Joint Statement criticizing the lack of public consultation, 
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transparency, and accountability surrounding the drafting process.296 In a Joint Letter, fourteen 
other international human rights organizations echoed the Joint Statement.297 
 To be sure, given that the nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states is a 
cardinal principle of ASEAN,298 any expectation that AICHR and AHRD would substantively 
advance either negative or positive gay and lesbian rights in the region was at best starry-eyed 
and at worst delusional. In this context, coupled with the fact that unlike both Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, Singapore is not a signatory to either the ICCPR or the ICESC, Section 377A of the 
Singaporean Penal Code is thoroughly shielded from any external monitoring or enforcement 
legal mechanism. Moreover, the comparatively more punitive reprisals and intolerant attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians in neighboring Malaysia also take the negative spotlight off 
Singapore.299 
 Last, Singapore’s considerable Malay/Muslim population (13.4%)300 also represents 
another religiously-mediated bastion of homosexuality-denying forces that both Hong Kong and 
Taiwan do not face. While it is not within the scope of this paper to adequately discuss Islamic 
attitudes toward homosexuality, it bears noting that some of the most homosexuality-denying 
countries today are Islamic ones301 even though historically speaking, “strict religious codes 
regarding sex have always rubbed shoulders with more permissive cultural expressions.”302 
Indeed, in the traditional societies of Malaysia and Indonesia—the two Southeast Asian states 
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that are predominantly Muslim—“gender categories are not dualistic and transgressive gender 
behavior or gender pluralism has many centuries of history with often pre-Islamic origins related 
to shamanistic practices.”303  
Nevertheless, Western colonialism and its pathologizing of same-sex attraction at the turn 
of the 20th century materially “overruled a tradition of social tolerance vis-à-vis homosexual 
practices” in many Islamic societies such as the Ottoman Empire.304 To acknowledge this 
historical point is not to overlook the numerous Quranic passages that, directly or otherwise, 
condemn sodomy and same-sex attraction. Indeed, one of the most homophobic statements in 
Singapore’s recent public discourse regarding greater societal tolerance for gays and lesbians 
came from a Malay Studies academic at the National University of Singapore, Dr. Syed Muhd 
Khairudin Aljunied, who likened lesbianism to “cancers” and “diseases.”305 
In the midst of the furor sparked by Dr. Aljunied’s controversial statements, the 
university’s Fellowship of Muslim Students Association issued a statement supporting him, and 
expressed concern over what the Association deemed, rather inventively, as “the Neo-Sodom-
Gomorrah community in Singapore and their efforts to mainstream and legalize LGBT values 
and lifestyles.”306 The Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association also 
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voiced its displeasure at the HPB for presenting what it considered to be unrepresentatively 
homosexuality-affirming public health information on its website.307 
In the 2007 debate on Singapore’s Penal Code, two Malay/Muslim MPs who spoke 
against the repeal of Section 377A—Mr. Zaqy Mohamad and Dr. Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim—
cited strongly homosexuality-denying sentiments from their Malay constituents.308 Additionally, 
of the three PAP MPs who spoke for decriminalization of same-sex acts between consensual 
adults in private, none was Malay/Muslim; one was Indian and two were Chinese of whom one 
was a Christian and the other, non-religious.309 
In closing, it is perhaps appropriate to underscore that the so-called Kulturkampf310 over 
gay and lesbian rights appears to be largely over in the West; a generational shift in public 
opinion has decidedly come of age.311 More generally, recent developments in gay and lesbian 
rights in the West support the sanguine claim that there is certain inexorable logic behind how 
human rights begin and expand within societies: 
“Mainstream groups, that is, males of the dominant ethnic group, are likely to gain 
increased rights as arbitrary state power collapses. Later, other forms of civil and political 
rights emerged, such as freedom of the press and the right to vote. While mainstream groups are 
securing basic rights, nonmainstream groups tend to be ignored. In due course, as the 
government abandons military and police methods for dealing with minorities, the status of 
minorities improves. As a government develops a welfare state, women’s rights improve. After 
                                                          
307 “Islamic association calls HPB’s FAQ insensitive to prevailing view on homosexuality,” Today, February 15, 2014, accessed 
arch 26, 2014, http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/islamic-association-calls-hpbs-faq-insensitive-prevailing-view-
homosexuality 
308 The full text of the relevant Parliamentary proceedings is available at 
http://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?currentTopicID=00002031-WA&currentPubID=00004748-WA&topicKey=00004748-
WA.00002031-WA_1%2B%2B 
309 Information from the Singapore Parliament website at http://www.parliament.gov.sg/list-of-current-mps 
310 Republican Patrick Buchanan famously said at the 1992 Republican National Convention that gay and lesbian activism, 
among other developments in American society, equated to the waging of a kind of “cultural war.” The transcript of Buchanan’s 
speech is available at http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/  
311 The PewResearch Religion & Public Life Project data on changing public attitudes on same-sex marriage is available at 
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/slide2.php 
77 
 
minorities and women enjoy victories in their struggle for equal civil and political rights, gays 
and lesbians begin to enjoy success in achieving equal rights.”
312
    
 While the above pattern is most visible in Taiwan, as two of the freest economies in the 
world, Hong Kong and Singapore are anything but immune from the global winds of change 
regarding gay and lesbian rights. As in everywhere else, progress that upsets the status quo will 
inevitably unleash conservative forces that will gleefully ascribe “to the least oscillations of 
sexuality… an imaginary dynasty of evils.” In addition, from the foregoing discussion, it is 
arguably the case that the drama regarding gay and lesbian rights is, paradoxically, not merely 
about whom one can legally bed or marry; the politics of sexual liberation have and will always 
implicate larger structures of power-relations. It is only by putting these structures—specifically 
their rhetoric, logics, ironies, and pathologies—on trial can one properly make sense of the 
politics of gay and lesbian rights in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
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